This year marks the centenary of what was undoubtedly a national disaster. After rinderpest virus entered this country in May 1865 it took two and a half years to restore order out of the chaos that followed. During that time something between one-quarter and one-third of a million cattle perished. That was about 6% of the national herd but in some localities the losses were very heavy indeed. In London they were about 40 % and in Cheshire, the worst affected area, they rose to about 66 %.
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The Cattle Plague of 18651 This year marks the centenary of what was undoubtedly a national disaster. After rinderpest virus entered this country in May 1865 it took two and a half years to restore order out of the chaos that followed. During that time something between one-quarter and one-third of a million cattle perished. That was about 6% of the national herd but in some localities the losses were very heavy indeed. In London they were about 40 % and in Cheshire, the worst affected area, they rose to about 66 %. The cost of the disease was estimated at £8,000,000 (Fleming 1875) .
For a fuller understanding of the plague it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the century. In 1801 the human population of this country was 11 millions but during the next fifty years there was an explosive growth so that by 1851 it had nearly doubled, to a total of 21 millions. The distribution of the population also changed and by the middle of the century immigrants from the country formed more than half of the inhabitants of the large towns. These changes created problems. The many new mouths had to be fed but the facilities for doing so were grossly inadequate. Refrigeration was unknown and, at first, there were no railways for providing rapid transport of farm produce. The development of town dairies only partially solved the problem and demands were made to rescind the prohibition on the importation of foreign livestock. In 1839 some cattle were imported from the Continent and they brought with them foot-andmouth disease; likewise contagious bovine pleuropneumonia was imported in 1841, but the worst was yet to come. 'This paper is based on an article which appeared in Medical History, 1962, 6, 45 , and is printed by kind permission of the editor and publishers ofthat journal.
Professor John Gamgee of the New Edinburgh Veterinary College could clearly see the danger of free trade in cattle and their diseases. He had made a particular study of the subject and could speak with a knowledge offacts when others could barely muster ill-founded impressions. In November 1863 he gave a public warning in The Times (Gamgee 1863 ) that rinderpest would be imported if Russian cattle were brought direct from a Baltic port.
The prediction was uncanny in its accuracy.
On May 29, 1865, the steamship Tonning docked at Hull with the first cargo of cattle to be brought direct from the Baltic. Some of the animals were sent to London where they were sold in the Metropolitan Market on June 1 (Burchell 1865 ). Among them were some carriers of rinderpest virus.
The disease broke out in London. On June 27, Mr Priestman, a veterinary surgeon, was called to examine some sick cows belonging to Mrs Nicholl of Laycocks Dairy, Islington, and on the next day he saw similar cases in Mr Baldwin's dairy at Hackney. Priestman was baffled. He had seen nothing like this before and on July 4 he consulted Professor J B Simonds for a second opinion (Priestman 1865) . Despite what was subsequently asserted, it seems clear that Simonds did not recognize the disease as rinderpest. It was a week before he took any action. He then reported to the Privy Council that a serious disease was spreading through the London dairies. Meanwhile, visibly diseased cattle were being sold in the Metropolitan Market.
With a nidus in such a large market there was bound to be a rapid spread throughout the country, for there was now in existence an extensive railway system that offered unprecedented means of transport for stock. By July 1 the plague had spread to Norfolk with some bullocks sent there from London. On July 5 there was an 25 799 outbreak in Beccles, in Suffolk, that was also traceable to cattle from London. On July 6 it occurred in Shropshire, near Market Drayton, among sormie animals that had been sent there direct from the Metropolitan Market. Infected stock had also been sent to Devon and on July 8 disease broke out near Plymouth (Williams 1868) .
There was no machinery for dealing with this dangerous situation. John Gamgee had spent years trying to establish a veterinary inspectorate but he had been politically out-manceuvred in the name of free trade. Various Orders in Council were made but they had no effect whatever in stemming the spread of disease. The national problem was being tackled on a parochial basis. The losses mounted rapidly and by September the situation was bad enough to warrant a national prayer to be said in all churches: 0 Lord God Almighty, whose are the cattle on a thousand hills, and in whose hand is the breath ofevery living thing, look down, we pray Thee, in compassion upon us, Thy servants, whom Thou hast visited with a grievous murrain among our herds and flocks. We acknowledge our transgressions, which worthily deserve Thy chastisement, and our sin is ever before us; and in humble penitence we come to seek Thy aid. In the midst of judgment, do Thou, 0 Lord, rememnber mercystay, we pray Thee, this plague by Thy word of power, and save that provision which Thou hast in Thy goodness granted for our sustenance. Defend us, also, gracious Lord, from the pestilence with which many foreign lands have been smitten; keep it, we beseech Thee, far away from our borders, and shield our homes from its ravages; so shall we ever offer unto Thee our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, for these Thy acts of providence over us, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.
Despite the widely held theurgical views on the disease, the Government deemed it wise to appoint a Royal Commission to enquire into the origin, cure and prevention of the disease. The First Report of the Commission was published on November 11. Its main purpose was to make recommendations for controlling the disease but no agreegent could be reached. The majority advised absolute stoppage of all cattle movements for a prescribed period. A minority group preferred to allow restricted movement under a system of permits; another minority report, that of one commissioner, was in favour of no restrictions whatever. However, all the commissioners were agreed that the slaughter of diseased animals, which had been pursued in a desultory sort of way, should be stopped forthwith and used only in exceptional cases. These widespread differences of opinion reflected the national mood. There were endless argu-ments in the newspapers as to what should be done and there was no lack of claims for successful treatment. The idea that cattle should be slaughtered as a positive means of control was lampooned as a policy of utter despair. People just could not understand that the approach to animal diseases was basically very different from that in the human sphere.
The Royal Commission had failed to provide a solution. It still had nothing useful to offer by February 5, 1866, when the Second Report was published. This repeated the necessity for stopping cattle movements and ingenuously concluded tha-t 'the present calamity shows how defective are our general precautionsif any precautions can be said to existfor the detection and prevention of cattle diseases'.
At the end of the year, the plague had reached most alarming proportions. Each month the number of fresh cases had doubled and the official estimate of losses was given as 73,549 animals, died and killed; this was almost certainly an understimate (Cathcart 1866).
In January 1866 the Archbishop of Canterbury asked that there should be a Day of National Humiliation but the Government rejected the request and instead took some action. In the space of one week in February 1866 the Cattle Diseases Prevention Bill was rushed through Parliament. At last a firm line was adopted; it was virtually the one advocated several months previously by Gamgee. Slaughter of all diseased animals was obligatory and those in contact with the disease could be slaughtered at the discretion of the Local Authority. In all cases compensation was to be paid from the local rate. At the same time very severe restrictions were imposed on cattle movement and importation.
The measures proved most effective and the disease was rapidly mastered, as is shown by the official returns of fresh cases: Epidemiological studies can never achieve the status of an exact science, as the variable factors in the field are numerous and inconstant, and each outbreak of virus infection in farm stock has individual features.
The myxovirus causing Newcastle disease exists as a large number' of strains antigenically almost identical. Most strains are resistant to adverse environmental conditions and are liable to survive for long periods (Olesiuk 1951). Strain virulence differs widely, and the effects of infection vary very greatly from that of rapidly fatal disease to one of subclinical infection. The strains causing the infection first experienced in Great Britain were viscero-neurotropic, while the less virulent strains recovered later were pneumoneurotropic. These strain characters can markedly influence the epidemiology of outbreaks.
The host range of Newcastle disease is wide. It can infect most species of domestic birds as well as many wild species, e.g. the starling (Gillespie et al. 1950) , the gannet (Wilson 1950), the sparrow and the jackdaw (Keymer 1961) and the shag (Blaxland 1951). Game birds have been associated with outbreaks (Gillespie 1952 , Lock 1960 , as have parrots and parakeets. Man would appear to be the only mammal infected under natural conditions, though other mammalian species can be infected in the laboratory. The rat has been recorded as a mechanical carrier (Asplin et al. 1949) gnd Wilson (1960, personal communication) was able to recover virus from fish fed on livers of infected chickens.
Thus, many species of birds and animals may play a more important role in spreading disease mechanically than as carriers infected with the virus.
In a single outbreak amongst domestic poultry a wide range of symptoms may be observed. The physical condition of the bird and its immediate environment can affect the severity of the clinical picture. Among these factors are stress of growth, high egg production, density of stocking and level of nutrition, as well as factors due to husbandry practices. The more developed the industry the more numerous are the physical pathways along which infection can be carried, and the greater the number of susceptible birds to be found in individual units.
The first outbreak recorded in Great Britain was at Newcastle upon Tyne in 1926. A virus causing heavy mortality was isolated from poultry that had been fed waste food from foreign ships in the port (Doyle 1927) . The disease was not then notifiable and the subsequent history is not well documented, though it is said to have given rise to 180 outbreaks in eleven counties (Doyle 1935, Committee on Fowl Pest Policy 1962). Infection was by bird to bird and mortality almost 100%. In the relatively undeveloped poultry industry these factors allowed infection to die out within eighteen months.
In 1933 Newcastle disease was diagnosed in a large commercial egg-laying flock in Hertford. The disease was again acute and fatal; no origin for this outbreak was found (Doyle 1935, Dobson 1939, Committee on Fowl Pest Policy 1962).
In 1936 fowl pest, which includes Newcastle disease and fowl plague, was made notifiable under the Diseases of Animals Acts, and this enabled it to be dealt with by a policy of slaughter.
During the war Newcastle infection spread into Poland from the Balkans, and reached this country from Poland and Hungary in 1947 as the result of a decision to relieve the shortage of animal protein by the importation of poultry carcases. Within two weeks acute Newcastle disease was diagnosed in Somerset in poultry which had access to waste food containing poultry offal (Reid 1961) . The epidemiology of the disease was similar to that recorded in 1926 and access to the offal of imported poultry carcases accounted for a third of the outbreaks in the first year. Bird-to-bird contact was also important in the spread of infection on dealers' premises. Measures to eradicate the disease by limiting and finally prohibiting the importation of poultry
